There has been plenty of research concerning the representation of voluntary action in the human brain. However, the question of how we represent the voluntary omission of an action has been largely neglected. Therefore this study aimed at investigating the representation of intentionally not doing something by means of event-related potentials (ERPs). Free choice non-actions elicit similar evoked potentials as free choice actions and instructed actions (augmented P2 and attenuated N2), which leads us to assume that the voluntary intention, not the overt non-action, is the characteristic feature of free choice non-action.
Introduction
In daily life we encounter three essential forms of non-action. First there are situations in which we have to choose between performing an act and refraining from it. For example if we spot an old woman who dropped her shopping bag, we can decide to assist her by picking up her groceries or we can choose to walk by. Since we cannot deny having had the option to help, this constitutes a free choice non-action. Societies recognize similar kinds of non-actions as intentional acts by considering them as crimes or negligence under the doctrine of intent. Second there are situations of idleness where we do not actually decide not to do anything in particular but simply while away our time. Third, there are situations in which we do not have a choice, but are forced not to act e.g. while waiting to cross a raised drawbridge. Outwardly those incidents of non-action may be hard to distinguish, but they can be classified according to their degree of intentionality and might therefore be processed differently in the human brain. When focussing on the degree of voluntariness one might even be tempted to regard free choice non-action as a form of action. Surprisingly, psychological research on human performance neglects free choice non-action almost completely and focuses entirely on the investigation of action and forced stimulus-based non-action as in Go/NoGo paradigms. This is presumably due to the fact that experiments on free choice non-action lack the typical dependent measures of experimental psychology, namely reaction times and error rates. Since electroencephalography permits to measure brain activity without the need of overt responses we aimed at investigating differences between classical 4 NoGo instructed non-actions and free choice non-actions by means of event-related potentials (ERPs).
For these purposes we used three different stimuli. One indicating that a response had to be executed (Instructed Go), another indicating that the subject had to refrain from responding (Instructed NoGo), and a third indicating free choice between responding and not responding (Free Go and Free NoGo) .
We aimed at addressing the question of whether free choice non-actions are more similar to free choice actions or to instructed non-actions. Free choice non-actions can either be conceptualized as resembling externally triggered inhibition (because in both cases participants refrain from responding), or as being similar to free choice actions (because both require intention formation).
Therefore we aimed at comparing the Instructed NoGo with the Free NoGo condition. This comparison avoids the confound with movement-related potentials that is present in the standard comparisons Go vs. NoGo. Since free choice non-action (Free NoGo) shares the feature of voluntariness with free choice action (Free Go) we assumed that the event-related potential should be similar. Likewise, we expected a similarity with instructed actions, because the initiation of an instructed response supposedly involves voluntary elements as well. Considering the degree of intention required, we aimed at focussing on the frontal P2 (respectively P3f) which has been associated with a selection for action and has been hypothesized to index activity involved in the organization of motor responses . We expected that Free Go, Free NoGo and Instructed Go trials should show an augmented P2 compared to Instructed NoGo trials, because those stimuli signal that an intention formation is required.
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Additionally, we set out to replicate the typical ERP pattern for the Instructed Go and NoGo conditions in an experimental context which lacked a clear response time limitation and had an equal probability of Go and NoGo trials. In a classical Go/NoGo paradigm several robust differences in the frontal ERP are observed when responses must be executed or inhibited. A larger N2 component in frontal regions is associated with NoGo stimuli compared to Go stimuli, especially when the Go response is prepotent (e.g. Bruin and Wijers 2002; Eimer 1993; Filipovic et al. 1999 Filipovic et al. , 2000 Nieuwenhuis et al. 2003) . Also frequently reported is an anterior focus for the NoGo P3, such that at frontal and centrals sites, P3 is larger for NoGo than Go stimuli,. This is also called the NoGo P300 "anteriorization" (e.g. Falkenstein et al. 1999 Falkenstein et al. , 2002 Fallgatter and Strik 1999) .
Methods

Participants
Sixteen participants (age range: 19 to 25 years, mean 20.9 years, 14 female, 2 male) participated in the experiment on the basis of informed consent and with ethical committee approval and according to the Declaration of Helsinki. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
All the participants were neurologically and psychiatrically healthy. Furthermore, as was indicated by a questionnaire (Van Strien, 1992 ) they were all right-handed (mean score = 9.57).
The score of this questionnaire ranges from -10 (extremely left-handed) to 10 (extremely righthanded). Subjects were paid for their participation and filled out an informed consent form. Three participants had to be removed from data analysis due to artifacts or recording problems.
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Procedure
The subjects were seated in a comfortable armchair in a light dimmed and sound attenuated room. Stimuli were presented on a color screen. Responses were given with the thumbs of the left and right hands on a response device which consisted of two cylinders with buttons on top attached to a wooden board. The stimuli were circles either in blue, orange or blue and orange (upper half of the circle blue and gradually turning to orange on the lower half) presented on a black background at the center of the screen and subtending 0.8° at a viewing distance of approximately 100 cm. Additionally, we used 200, 400, 600 and 800 Hz sinus wave tones of 200 ms duration which the subjects heard through Sennheiser headphones.
Half of the participants were instructed to press both buttons when a blue circle appeared (Instructed Go) and to press no button when an orange circle appeared (Instructed NoGo). For the other half of the participants the task mapping for the blue and orange circle was reversed in order to compensate for perceptual differences. Whenever a two-colored circle appeared on the screen the subjects had to decide between pressing both buttons (Free Go) or no button (Free NoGo). They were asked to aim at an equal distribution of both response options without having a certain rule of responding. We asked the participants to flip an imaginary coin in mind in the moment when the two-colored circle appeared. We used an inter-trial interval of 1000, 1500 or 2000 ms; and then presented a white cross on a black background for 100 ms, which was followed by a blank screen for 100 ms. Then a circle was presented for 200 ms. When the subjects responded we presented a tone with a delay of 250 ms. With reference to the history of reaction times (RTs) in Go trials we calculated the delay until the tone was presented in NoGo trials as the mean RT plus 250 ms. The assignment of action and non-action to the effect tones was balanced across subjects.
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Participants were asked to maintain fixation on the center of the screen. Both speed and accuracy were stressed. Before the experimental session started, a practice block with eight trials was run.
The practice block was discarded from the analysis. The experimental session consisted of 9 blocks with 48 trials each. After each block there was a short break. Considering the literature (e.g. Nieuwenhuis 2003 Nieuwenhuis , 2004 and based on visual inspection of the data, the peak amplitude of the N2 was determined by searching backwards in time for the first negative peak encountered in the window of 200-300 ms following the stimulus. The peak amplitude of the P2 was determined by searching for the most positive peak in the window of 150-250 ms post stimulus. Similarly we searched for the most positive peak in the window of 300-500 ms to determine the P3.
Electrophysiological Recordings
Our main interest was on the P2, N2 and P3 peak amplitude data of a frontal ROI (comprising electrodes F3, Fz, F4, and FCz) additionally we present the data of a central-parietal ROI (comprising electrodes C3, Cz, C4, and Pz) in order to exclude that the pattern observed in the frontal ROI is not representative for the whole brain pattern. The peak amplitude data for both
ROIs were subjected to a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors Go/Nogo and actiontype (Free vs. Instructed). The Greenhouse Geiser correction was applied when there was more than one degree of freedom in the numerator. The corrected p values are reported. Post-hoc paired t-tests were employed. Scalp plots were plotted with EEGLAB (Delorme and Makeig
2004).
EMG
We used a change detection algorithm based on the approximated generalized likelihood ratio test (AGLR) (Staude 2001) to determine the average EMG onset latency for each subject and for the Free Go and instructed Go condition separately.
We calculated the mean of right and left thumb EMG over a window of +/-50ms around the average EMG onset latency of the Free Go condition in order to determine the mean EMG signal for the Free Go and Free NoGo condition. This assumes that EMG activity related to the free choice not to act should be at a similar latency as the EMG onset of the free choice to act. The same procedure with a window around the average EMG onset latency of the Instructed Go condition was applied to determine the mean EMG signal for the Instructed Go and Instructed
NoGo condition.
The mean EMG values were subjected to a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors Go/Nogo and action-type (Free vs. Instructed) and post-hoc paired-t-tests were performed.
.
Results
Behavioral data
Participants responded erroneously in the Instructed NoGo condition in 0.005% of the trials.
Participants succeeded in deciding equally often for both response options in the free choice condition. On average participants decided in 50.7% of the free choice trials to respond and in 49.3% not to respond (t(12) = 0.72, p = 0.48). The mean reaction time (RT) in the instructed Go condition was 434 ms which was significantly slower compared to the RT in the Free Go condition of 465 ms (t(12) = 2.787, p < 0.05). This clearly indicates that the participants followed the instruction to choose between acting and not acting when the choice stimulus appeared on the screen, because the reaction times in the free choice condition are significantly higher compared to the instructed condition. A 2 x 3 repeated-measure ANOVA with the factor jitter and actiontype (Free vs. Instructed) yielded a significant effect of action type (F(1,12)= 7.766, p < 0.05) and of jitter (F(2,24) = 20.090, p < 0.001) but no significant interaction of action-type x jitter (F(2,24) = 0.198, p = .822, Figure 1 ). The fact that the slopes of reaction times in dependence on the jitter interval (fore-period effects) are similar for free choice and instructed actions suggests that participants do not pre-decide in the free choice action condition. In case of a premature preparation one would expect the slope of free choice actions to be steeper than instructed actions.
Event Related Potentials
The grand-average ERPs of all conditions at the electrodes F3, F4, Fz, FCz, C3, Cz, C4 and Pz locked to the stimulus are depicted in Figure 2 (scalp plots in Figure 3 ). Considering the t(12) = 6.43, p < 0.01; remaining t-tests p > .12). The grouping by means of a comparable P2 augmentation could be explained by the intention formation which is absent only in the condition of instructed no action.
We plot peak amplitude µV values of the frontal ROI for the N2 component in Figure 5 and for the P3 component in Figure 6 . Since the pattern of results of the P2 is highly similar to that of the N2 we performed a peak-topeak analysis considering the difference between the P2 peak amplitude and the N2 peak amplitude as the N2 effect. The fact that the ANOVA as well as t-tests reveal no significant effects (frontal ROI: p > 0.47; parietal ROI: p > 0.34) could suggest that the differences observed in the N2 peak amplitudes are carry-over effects of the P2 amplitude effect. 
Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the functional properties of free choice nonactions. Free choice non-actions can be conceptualized in two contradictory ways. From a phenomenological perspective, free choice non-actions bear a strong resemblance to externally triggered inhibition, because in both cases participants do not respond overtly. However, from a theoretical perspective free choice non-actions share a crucial property with voluntary actions, because both involve intentionally choosing between alternatives. By using ERP we tried to separate these two potential interpretations of free choice non-actions. If free choice non-actions are similar to free choice actions one would expect similar frontal selection-related ERP components, even though participants choose to act in one condition but choose not to act in the other condition. ERPs in both conditions should only differ regarding the response initiation component. However, if free choice non-actions are functionally related to externally triggered inhibition (Instructed NoGo), one would expect ERP components to be similar to this condition.
In accordance with the hypothesis that free choice non-actions resemble free choice actions, ERPs were nearly identical until up to 350ms after stimulus presentation. The only marginal (not 14 significant) difference occurred in an attenuation of the P3 in the free choice action condition, and this can be attributed to motor-related negativity due to the initiation of a response.
Upon comparing the ERPs of free choice non-actions with those of instructed non-actions certain differences catch the eye. The frontal N2 as well as the P3 component is more augmented for the instructed non-actions. This bears a striking resemblance with the classical pattern of Go/NoGo ERPs (as referred to in the Introduction), with the difference that in our data free choice nonactions take over the part of the typical Go signal. The absence of a significant interaction effect in RT between action-type and jitter suggest that participants did not decide in advance how to respond in the free choice condition. Additionally, the alternative explanation, that free choice non-actions involve subtle motor responses which do not affect instructed non-actions, was ruled out by means of EMG.
To summarize, we conclude that free choice non-actions are more similar to free choice actions and instructed actions than to instructed non-actions. This supports our initial grouping of the first three processes which are characterized by the shared P2 response, which is lacking for instructed non-actions.
Intentionality as revealed by P2 and N2
The characteristics of the P2 in the experiment are supportive of our intentionality assumption.
We find a comparable P2 augmentation in conditions involving deliberate intention formation, whereas in the condition in which no active intention is required, and subjects are merely instructed not to respond, the P2 is significantly smaller. This frontal positive deflection has been variously termed anterior P2 (P2a) Potts et al. 2004; Potts and Tucker 2001) , frontal P3 (P3f) or frontal selection positivity (FSP) (Anollo-Vento et al. 1998; Kenemans et al. 1993 Kenemans et al. , 1995 . Both the P2a and the P3f are correlated with reaction time Potts et al. 1996) . Therefore Makeig et al. (1999) hypothesized that the P3f indexes activity involved in the organization of a motor response. However, P2a has not only been implicated when overt responses were required, but also in a silent count task lacking motor execution (Potts et al. 1996) . Summarizing, the P2 has been associated with response-related processes that enable the selection of a response on the basis of the relevant stimulus information.
Because the ERPs of the different conditions group very similarly in the N2 peak amplitude measure, it is difficult to conclude whether or not the effects we observed are caused by the underlying P2 or the N2 component. of Go signals cause a general bias toward the Go response, which leads to increased conflict in NoGo trials and to reduced conflict on Go trials. This conflict interpretation of the N2 cannot account for our results, because the amount of conflict is likewise high in both free choice conditions. According to the growing amount of fMRI literature exploring the differences between free-choice and instructed actions, fronto-median brain areas like the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) and/or the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) are involved in voluntary response selection (Cunnington et al. 2006; Müller et al. 2007; van Eimeren et al. 2006) . Because these areas are very close and partly overlap with brain regions assumed to be involved in conflict monitoring, this would predict an augmentation of the N2 for the free choice action and the free choice non-action condition. Since only the instructed non-action condition shows an N2 augmentation, our results argue against an involvement of conflict in intentional response selection. Another possible confound associated with conflict could be seen in a higher degree of arousal elicited by conflict due to freedom of choice in the Free Go and Free
NoGo condition. But since we observe a grouping of the ERP signal for all three conditions involving intention formation, namely both free choice conditions and the Instructed Go condition, where no free choice is permitted we can exclude that the similarity of the two free choice conditions is caused by arousal due to conflict.
Another prominent interpretation of the Go/NoGo N2 effect is that it reflects inhibition of the execution of predominant inappropriate responses (Kopp et al. 1996) . Because we do not have a predominant response in our design, this rationale likewise does not explain the occurrence of the N2. Moreover if assuming that responding was more prominent than not responding, we would have to expect a pronounced N2 component in the Free NoGo condition as well.
An alternative explanation of the N2 which resembles the interpretation of the P2 as involving response-related processes that enable the selection of a response has been proposed by Bruin and Wijers (2002) . The authors interpret their N2 effects as a modulation of the ERP due to activation in response to Go stimuli, rather than due to inhibition in response to NoGo stimuli ).
This Go-related reduced N2 is supposed to reflect the stronger response preparation process.
That interpretation of the N2 fits the general pattern of our results, and it would imply that the free choice non-action involves response preparation. The response that is voluntarily not performed is represented in the brain in contrast to the instructed non-action where this representation is not needed.
Reduction of P3 in active Go responses
The first point in time when the two free choice responses, free choice actions and free choice non-actions diverge is at about 350 ms post stimulus. In this time window of the early P3 component the ERP signal of the Free NoGo condition resembles the instructed NoGo condition.
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The precise interpretation of the P3 component is still a matter of debate. In Go/NoGo experiments the P3 is mostly interpreted as reflecting inhibition Burle et al. 2004; Kopp et al. 1996; Strik et al. 1998 ) but this interpretation requires the prepotency of a response.
Furthermore it is suggested that the P3 might be partly confounded with the overlapping contingent negative variation (CNV) caused by the response in the Go condition (Kok 1986; Oddy et al. 2005; Sailsbury et al. 2001 Sailsbury et al. , 2004 Simson et al. 1977; Smith et al. 2006 Smith et al. , 2007 . Sailsbury et al. (2004) compare a silent-counting task P3 where subjects counted the amount of Go stimuli and ignored NoGo stimuli with the P3 elicited by the same NoGo stimuli when they responded overtly to the Go stimuli. Since they found no significant difference for the P3 they concluded that the P3 Go/NoGo effect is mainly caused by a more pronounced negative signal of the active Go response. This would explain why the Instructed Go P3 is significantly smaller than the complementary Instructed NoGo P3 as well as why the Free Go P3 is close to being significantly smaller then the Free NoGo P3 in the frontal ROI.
Comparison with Go/NoGo studies
Although the main focus of our study was on free choice non-action, our results of the Instructed Go and Instructed NoGo conditions bear a strong resemblance with classical Go/NoGo ERP studies with respect to peak amplitude of N2 and P3.
Since the increase in the N2 for NoGo trials is thought to be dependent on prepotent responding, it is important to determine whether subjects prepared to respond ahead of the trial in order to compare our results to those studies. The behavioral results indicate that the participants followed the instruction not to choose between acting and not acting before the choice stimulus appeared on the screen. Apart from that it has been reported that speed instructions can also lead to response preparation even if the probability of Go and NoGo stimuli are equally distributed (Nieuwenhuis et al. 2003; Jodo and Kayama 1992) . Though in our design actions and non-actions are equally frequent and there is little time pressure, the only response limit is the presentation of the effect tone after the mean reaction time plus an additional 250 ms. From that we conclude that our participants had no bias for one or the other response option. Although we have no strong speed instruction and our action and non-action trials are equally frequent, our results of the frontal ROI bear a striking resemblance (concerning N2 and P3) with the data of Nieuwenhuis et al. (2003) and Bruin and Wijers (2002) with respect to the peak amplitude of N2 (similar to Nieuwenhuis et al. 2003; . Those studies likewise use a .50 probability of NoGo trials butin contrast to our experiment -do employ a speed instruction. This contradicting finding disappears when we employ a peak-to-peak measure of the N2.
Conclusion
Summarizing, the data confirmed our hypothesis that although with both instructed non-actions and free choice non-actions participants do not respond overtly, the neural correlates show remarkable differences. We interpret the P2 augmentation and the N2 attenuation in free choice non-actions as the result of response representation and response-selection processes. Moreover the absence of an N2 augmentation in the free choice conditions argues against an involvement of conflict in free choice response selection. We were able to show that free choice non-actions elicit evoked potentials similar to free choice and instructed actions, thereby strengthening our assumption that the intentionality and not the overt non-action is the characteristic feature of free choice non-action. This prompts us to consider the deliberate omission of an action as a mode of action and might justify current judicial procedures which regard certain voluntary non-actions to be crimes as e.g. refraining from helping injured persons at the scene of a traffic accident. 
